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INSURANCE LAW – UNFAIR, UNCLEAR,
ARCHAIC AND INACCESSIBLE?
The English and Scottish Law Commissions are
undertaking a joint review of insurance contract law.
Insurance law has frequently been criticised as outdated
and potentially harsh to policyholders. Reports
recommending reform were published by the Law Reform
Committee in 1957, the English Law Commission in
1980, the National Consumer Council in 1997 and the
British Insurance Law Association in 2002. These
recommendations have not been implemented.
Since the English Law Commission’s review in 1980,
there have been significant developments in the regulation
of the insurance market-place. There is now a statutory
regulator – the Financial Services Authority – which issues
conduct of business rules. Regulated firms are obliged to
participate in a statutory complaints-resolution scheme,
the Financial Ombudsman Service. Valuable as these
developments are, we do not regard them as a complete
solution. The rules do not address all the perceived ills of
the law, and do not apply in their entirety to all classes of
policyholder. Complaints can only be considered by the
Financial Ombudsman Service if made by a consumer or a
small business. Furthermore, the overall position looks
increasingly incoherent, with fundamental issues being
addressed differently by insurance contract law, the rules
and guidance issued by the ombudsmen.
At the outset of our current review we decided that we
would look at misrepresentation, non-disclosure and breach
of warranty. We have also issued a Scoping Paper, seeking
opinions as to which other areas deserve consideration. In
early consultations it has been clear that there is wide
support for reform, though inevitably there are differing
opinions as to the nature and extent of any changes.
One of the main criticisms put to us is that the law is
unfair, resulting in an imbalance of rights between insurer
and policyholder. An applicant for insurance is, for
example, obliged when applying for a policy to disclose all
material facts – defined as those facts that would have an
effect, not necessarily decisive, on the mind of a prudent
insurer. It may not be easy for an applicant with little or no
knowledge of insurance practice to meet this test. If there
is a non-disclosure, which induces the contract, the insurer
is entitled to avoid the policy from outset and reject any
claim. As a matter of law this is so even if the non-
disclosure is entirely innocent. The results can often be
disproportionate. In our Scoping Paper we gave the
example of a married couple who failed to mention the
wife’s partial loss of hearing when effecting a critical illness
policy. Had the insurer been aware of the true facts, it
would still have issued the policy, subject to an exclusion
relating to her hearing. Sadly the wife subsequently died
from a completely unconnected condition – leukaemia.
The insurer discovered the non-disclosure and avoided the
policy. One national newspaper recently reported that one
in five critical illness claims are rejected, most for
non-disclosure.
There are also areas where the law is unclear. Whatever
the intention of those who drafted section 17 of the
Marine Insurance Act 1906, it has been established that
there is a post-contractual duty of good faith – with one
member of the House of Lords commenting that the contrary
is “past praying for”. However, recent cases demonstrate
the uncertainty surrounding the nature and extent of that
duty – for example, whether it extends into litigation, the
impact of fraudulent devices and whether interim payments
can be recovered on the basis of subsequent fraud.
In some areas, the law is founded on eighteenth century
statutes and cases, and no longer looks fit for the modern
environment. Life insurers are limited in the policies they
can offer by the provisions of the Life Assurance Act 1774.
Policies, for example, can be issued on the life of a spouse
or civil partner, but not on the life of a cohabitant. Do such
distinctions serve a useful purpose?
Finally, the rules governing the rights and obligations of
the parties to an insurance policy are not easily accessible.
Where consumers are concerned, for example, it is
necessary to look in a range of sources, including statutes,
cases, the rules issued by the Financial Services Authority,
codes of practice issued by the Association of British
Insurers and guidance published by the Financial
Ombudsman Service.
As we now move into the next phase of the review, we
intend to issue a short series of seminar papers, providing
a focus for discussion on some of the key issues. This will
be followed in 2007 by a formal consultation paper on
perceived problems in the law, and potential solutions.
Once consultation has closed we will prepare a final report
and, if appropriate, a draft Bill.
We very much hope that those with an interest in this
area will continue to give us the benefit of their experience
and views throughout this period. Those wishing to follow
the progress of the project can do so through our website
at: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/insurance_contract.htm
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